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A. Purpose and Methodology
The pxirpose of this study is to present the politicaQ. philosophy of
John Devey, with eia^jhasis on his theory of democracy.
The methodology of this investigation is descriptive and analytical.
This work is divided into five chapters in which we will focus attention
on Dewey's main ideas of politics and democracy and analyze them in terms
of the canon of logic and empirical evidence. Chapter I deals with
Dewey's early life and background as well as the basic elements of his
thought. In chapter II, Dewey's theory of the origin, nature suad functions
of the state is presented and analyzed; chapter III and IV are devoted to
our author's doctrine of democracy and its ethical foundations. To present
a summary and evaluation of this investigation is our chief task in chapter
V.
Interest in this paper is directed toward Dewey's political philosophy
rather than to his total philosophy. Therefore, only those parts of his
total philosophy will be introduced that have direct and immediate bearing
on his political philosophy. Presentation of Dewey's political philosophy,
however. Involves certain difficulties. One ceuinot separate particular
facets of the man's thou^t from his total philosophy and any such atten^jt
cannot do justice to him. We do not try to isolate except for the limited
pTjrposes of inquiry. He is a very methodical thinker whose total philosophy
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is Integrated and interrelated. He is not easy to read and understand.
His writing is sometimes awkward.
B. Significance of Investigation
John Dewey is generally admitted to be one of the leading contemporary
philosophers.
Dewey has had profound influence in many areas, such as education,
aesthetics, general philosophy and political theory. As a political
theorist, his contributions are important because he is one of the first
contemporary philosophers to justify democracy on naturalistic grounds.
Many have Justified democracy in terms of universal standards and fixed
principles, but few have used the naturalistic approach. Dewey Justifies
democracy on functional grounds. Democracy, in Dewey's view, fosters
certain ways of thinking eind actingi Moreover, it institutes certain con¬
ditions which facilitate the resolution of social problems. Democracy is
more than a political concept for Dewey; it is a social and moral concept
which should permeate all the institutions of a culture.
Of the many studies of John Dewey, few have dealt with his political
philosophy. The present writer hopes that this study will contribute to
the understanding of Dewey's political philosophy and serve as a basis of
further research.
C. Early Life and Background
Perhaps one of the great forces in conten^joraiy moral emd value theory,
education, and political theory is John Dewey's philosophy. Born in I859
in Burlington, Vermont,^ Dewey, after graduating from the University of
^Irwin Edman, John Dewey (New York, 1955)^ PP* 15-21.
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Vermont In 1879^ taught high school for three years. He then studied
philosc^hy privately for a year under Professor H. A. P. Torrey, who was
able to spend more time in the development of Dewey's mind than the class
room would allow. "Professor Torrey based his teachings on Scottish
philosophy and vindoubtedly formed an important part of Dewey philosophical
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background". During this period, Dewey periodically submitted eirticles
to the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, edited by Dr. W. T. Harris. It
is felt by many of Dewey's interpreters that Professor Torrey and Dr. Harris
together were perhaps among the chief influences operating on Dewey's.
3
decision to go to JohnsHopkins University for graduate work in philosophy.
In 1879, when Dewey left the University of Vermont, there were "less than
half a dozen colleges and diversities" on the American scene where philo-
k
sophy was entirely free from reference to theological formulae". Colleges
were, on the whole, very poor, but some were excellent. It was significant
for Dewey's development that he decided to study at one of these institu¬
tions - JohnfeHopkins.^ Although Scottish realism prevailed as a philosophy,
"the department of philosophy at JohqsHopkins incorporated every twist of
American thought in opposition to the 'realism of McCash'".^ The members
Norton White, The Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism (New York, 19^3
p. 4.
O
Houston Peterson (ed.). Essays in Philosophy (New York, 1950), pp. 38I-
382.
^G. Stanley Hall, "Philosophy in the United States," Mind, IV (1879), as





of the departnaent of philosophy were Charles Pierce, George S. Morris and
G. Stanley Hall.
According to Morton Waite, George S. Morris was the teacher Wao possibly
7
had the greatest irapeict on Dewey. Morris was primarily interested in the
history of philosophy. He was largely responsible for the shaping of
the first fifteen years of Dewey’s philosophical thought.® Morris' philo¬
sophy was predominately neo-Hegelian idealism. Dewey thus came under the
influence of Hegel in a moderated fona.^ In fact, Dewey attributes to Hegel
and George Mortis his passion for amity and interrelatedness.^*^ His serious
entry into the field of philosophy began with a study of Hegel.^
Although Dewey's discovery of Pierce came twenty years later, the in¬
fluence exerted by Hall led to an almost immediate interest in experimental
psychology.^ He never became a student of experimental psychology in the
full sense of the term, but he beceune greatly interested in the relation
of psychology to philosophy. "Thus Dewey was both the idealist philosopher
and the follower of the new psychology".^® The more Dewey probed into the
field of psychology, the more he noted that the confirmation of the results
'^Ibid., p. 8.
®Ibid., p. 8.
Peterson, op. cit., p. 32.
^^Edman, John Dewey (New York, 1955)# P« 32.
^Morton White (ed.). The Age of Analysis (New York, 1955)# P» 173.
^White, Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism, p. 8.
^3ibid., p. 3^.
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in biology, sociology and psychology to idealism were superficial. By
the 1890's, Dewey was achieving the transition from idealism to instru¬
mentalism. He no longer tried to incorporate experience or actvial existence
into the ideal, but instead began "his long crusade for the application of
l4
intelligence in social ai’fairs". He began to subscribe to the view of
science as the social motor.
As seen from Dewey's new philosophical enphasis, self-realization
was still man's purpose in the universe. However, the term "self-realiza¬
tion" was used in a different sense from the idealistic perspective. He
had used the term in the sense of "the self" as a universal consciousness
but by the l890's our author conceived of the "the self" as individual con-
15
sciousness and of its fulfillment in the social millieu.
C. Elements of Dewey's Philosophical- Thought
1. The Element of Idealism
There are elements of idealism in Dewey's thought. After the l890's
he changed his major philosophical framework but he never con^jletely aban¬
doned all idealistic strains. For instance, throughout his philosophic
16
quest, Dewey was committed to the proposition of the viniverse as process.
This view had its beginning in Dewey's idealistic philosophical background
and was incorporated into his naturalistic philosophy. Another idealistic
17
element in Dewey's philosophy is that of "self-realization".
^^Ibid.. pp. 104-105.
^^Jbhn Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York, 1920), ch. 3*




Dewey rejects the notion of a final euad fixed good. However, he is
deeply concerned with ethical problems. In Outlines of a Critical Theory
of Ethics, Dewey says:
Three of the breuaches of philosophy may be called
normative, implying that they deal with some norm,
stand6u:xi or end, estimating the value of their re¬
spective subject matters tested by this end. These
are logic, dealing with the end Truth, euad the
value of the intellectueil processes with respect
to it: Aesthetics, dealing with Beauty and the
value of emotional, conditions as referred to it;
and Ethics...But this norm in no case comes from
outside the subject matter; it is the subject
matter; it is the subject matter considered in its
toteuLity.l®
2. The Pragmatic, Instrumental and
Experimental Elements
In the 1890’s, Dewey became a pragmatist in the sense in -vdaich William
James uses the term: pragmatism as a philosophical method and pragmatism
19
as a conception of tnith. ^ His assuniptions about the universe, about
man's place in the universe and about h\iman natxire reflect this change.
The latter part of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of Dewey’s
theory of the nattire of the universe euad the nature of human nature.
E5cperimentalism has often been the primary designation of Dewey's
philosophy because one of the main foundations of his thoaight after the l890's
was that of experimentation. "The method of experimentation is the very
essence of the method of modem science and is the flesh and blood (not the
bone) over which Dewey's whole philosophy contends," notes Joseph Ratner.^
•^^Ibid., also see Dewey, Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics,
Reprint of I89I ed. (New York, 1957)^ PP* 1"2. ’
^^William James, "What Pragmatism Means" in Essay in Pragmatism, ed.,
Alburey Castell (New York, 19^8), pp. l4l-158.
20
Joseph Ratner (ed.). Intelligence in the Modem World (New York, 1939)^
pp. 57-58.
T
Whereas ejjperiraentalism is preferred by some of Dewey's critics and
friends to designate his philosophy, instrumentalism is preferred by
others. Indeed, Dewey himself has been known to use both terms inter-
21
changeably. Instrumentalism is used in the sense of designating the
relationship of theory to practice. Dewey felt that "final values" or
ideals must have "cash-value" when set to work within the' stream of ex-
pp
perience."^ Theories become instruments to be set to work within the
particular practical aspects of existence.
No term is adequate to present all the dimensions of Dewey's total
philosophy. The above-mentioned designations serve merely to indicate
and define certain channels in which his thought flowed.
There are many meanings of the term "pragmatism". Let us consider
William James' definitions; as a method for settling disputes and, as a
conception of truth. As a method in the settlement of disputes, it "tries
to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences"
In a dispute the rightness of one side of the argument is to be foxind in
the practical differences that exist between the two positions. The
theory holds that "there can be no difference any where that doesn't make
24
a difference elsewhere". The essence of this premise is that there can
be no difference in abstract truth that does not express itself in con¬
crete fact and in conduct depending upon knowledge of fact.
See James, op. cit., p. 145., and Dewey, "The Field of 'Value" in
Value; A Cooperative Inquiry, ed. Ray Lepley (New York, 1949), p. T4.
23





Not only is pragmatism a method; it also represents a philosophical
attitude-the empirical attitude, which turns away from abstraction, from
verbal solutions from < bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles and
turns toward action, facts and power.^5 William James asserts that it is
an attitude which seeks to bring the realm of science and metaphysics
26
nearer together by eliminating concerns. "It (philosophy) is a method
only".27
Sidney Hook, in his exeimination of Dewey, found that, according to
Dewey, philosophies have primarily been concerned with the defense or
criticism of certain ways of life, beliefs and action in the culture of
which they are a part. They are rationalizations or criticisms of what
people believe, hope, or do and, therefore, they have a bearing upon
conduct and a practical influence on affairs, even when they boast of their
28
impracticality. So abandoning rationalizations, Dewey advocates that
one of the functions of philosophy is to help one choose between alterna¬
tives of action. "His proposal is that philosophy should do consciously













Dewey also makes use of the pragmatic method in resolving moral
questions. He would transfer the right and burden of morality to intelli¬
gence through the application of the pragmatic method. He says that
*'in order to discover the meaning of an idea ask for its consequences.
A moral situation is one in which much judgment and choice are required
antecedently to overt action".^®
Pragmatism is, therefore, a philosophical framework for an instrumental
philosophy, a philosophy which can be used in solving "problematic situati.ons".
The method used by pragmatism to solve "problematic situations" is that of
science. And of course experimentation is very much a part of this method.
For Dewey, "all cognitive experience must start from And must terminate in
h31
being and having things....
A second frame of reference for the pragmatic philosophy is its con¬
ception of "truth". Closely allying itself with science, pragmatism postu¬
lates that "ideas become true just in so far as they help us to get into
32
satisfactory relation with the other parts of our experience." James
considers Dewey's view of "truth" conservative as con5)ared to other pragma¬
tists. He used the term "conservative" in the sense that, according to
him, Dewey recognizes the impact of already existing predispositions, beliefs
3*^John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. I65.
on
Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago, 1926), p. 70.
00
James, "What Pragmatism Means" in Essays in Pragmatism, p. l^T-
10
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and traditions % Old ejcperiences are considered in determining trat'hj feig
well as new experiences.
'The true' is the name of whatever proves itself
to he good in the way of belief, and good too
for definite, assignable reasons.’^
For Dewey, these definite, assignable reasons are ^ facto in nature
(existing in fact) with a "motor aspect" and ein "emotive aspect".^^
He also notes that they rest "upon current mores, plus the manipulation
of those in position of superior economic, political and/or ecclesiastical
n 36
power .
3. Assumptions About Nature and Human Nature
a. The Nat\ire of the Universe
Perhaps owing to his earlier philosophical debt to Hegel, Dewey con¬
ceives of the universe as being in a constant state of flux or cheuage..
The universe, for Dewey, is an open one, infinite in space, time, and
con5)lexity of internal structure. "It is so multiple and far reaching
that it cannot be summed up and grasped in any one formula."3^ Change,
for Dewey, "is the measure of reality."3® It is omnipresent. The laws
33ibid., pp. 154-156.
34^ Ibid.





in which modern man is interested, juxtaposed to ancient science and philo-
OQ
sophy, are "laws of motion, of generation and consequence."'^^
Modem man speaks of law -vdiere the ancients spoke of
kind and essence, because what he wants is a corre¬
lation of changes, and ability to detect one change
occurring in correspondence with another.^®
The only constant in the existence of Dewey's universe^^ is that of
a formula for description €uad calculation of interdependent changes. He
rejects the idea of rank and order which characterized medieval science
and asserts that the key to understanding 'celestial existences* is to re¬
cognize that all have equal dignity. This means that there is no particu¬
lar celestial existence which deserves superior rating above others. All,
42
of course, can be managed, combined at will into old and new forms.
There is also in Dewey's philosophy a democracy (equal dignity) among the
elements of terrestial existences. Dewey's universe is "relatively malleable
and plastic; it may be used for this end or that".^3 "ijihe mechanization of






Dewey subscribes to the modern science view of the natiire of the







Education and morals will begin to find themselves
on the same road of advance.. .when they too learn
fully the lesson of wholehearted and unremitted
attention to means and conditions-that is, to what
mankind so long despised as material suid mechanical. ^
When the consciousness of science is fully impregnated
with the consciousness of human vsilues, the great dualism
which now weighs humanity down, the split between the
material, the scientific and moral and ideal will be
destroyed.
b. Dualism
Dewey's "democracy of elements" in his theory of the nature of the
universe leads him to an opposition to dualisms. He is opposed to dualism
in the traditional sense of the division of reality into physical and
mental, theory and practice, en5)irical and rational, hviman nature and
biological nature, and means and ends in the choice of values. The
"bifurcation" of nature is inharmonious with Dewey's philosophy. Reality
is known through a "continuum of inquiry" in which dualism has no place.
He asserts that:
The objection to dualism is not just that it is a
dualism, but that it forces upon us antithetical,
non-convertible principles of formulation and
interpretation. If there is a con^slete split in
nature and ejqierlence then of coxirse no Ingenuity
can e^lain it away; it must be accepted. But in
case no such division actually exists, the evils






Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 241.
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In Dewey's world there is "Intersection of the nat\ire of the indivi¬
dual and the generic, of chance and law," "of overt and executive activity
with thought and feeling," "of mind and matter','A® "Interaction" here
has the connotation of integration into \d20le of being. It means that
there is no euitual division in nature. Rejection of dualism is another
way of putting it.
c. The Nature of Human Nature
Man, to Dewey, is a part of the universe and a participant in the
processes of change in the universe as both product and producer of those
49
on-going processes. ^ Dewey means more than the proposition that man is
an animal in a biological or physical sense; man is also, he insist,
a product of cultural Influences.
...Life processes have a physical aspect euad no
accovint of them is adequate that does not draw
from available physical knowledge. But this is
a radically different matter from reduction to
physical terms. Furthermore, while human be¬
havior has, without doubt, an animal, as well as
a physical aspect, it has such distinctive features
and properties that it cannot be reduced to exclu¬
sively physiological terms. It suffices here to
cite the fact of language, that cannot occur with¬
out physical conditions nor without physiological
processes, but cannot be reduced to them without
maiking non-sense of all its characteristic traits.^
Although men are born organic beings into an aseociation with others,
the work of conversion of the physical and organic phases of associative
behavior into a community of action saturated and regulated by mutual
^^Ibid.. p. 393-
^^^Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York, 1922), p. viii.
^^Dewey, "The Field of Value," Value; A Cooperative Inquiry, p. 65.
Ik
interest in shared meanings, does not occur all at once, Dewey maintains.
It is achieved through \inremitting instruction, education and learning in
connection with the phenomena of overt association; and to learn to be
human is to develop through the give-and-taike of communication and effective
sense of being individually distinctive as a member of a community. We
interpret this to mean "self-awareness” as a member of the community is
developed. Learning to be human also involves becoming a member of the
community who understands and appreciates its beliefs, desires, and methods,
and who contributes to a further conversion of organic power into h^lman
resources and values. But Dewey maintains that the transformation is
never finished because the "unregenerate element in human nat\u:e persists.^^
Existentially speaking, a human individual is
distinctive opacity of bias and preference con¬
joined with plasticity and permeability of
needs and likings. One trait tends to isola¬
tion, discreteness; the other trait to connec¬
tion, continuity. This ambivalent character
is rooted in nature whose events have their own
distinctive indifferences, resistances, arbi¬
trary closvires and intolerances and also their
peculiar openness, warm responsiveness# greedy
seekings and transforming union.
Dewey says that everything may be done with this ambivalent character of
man" excejpt get rid of it".^^
5%atner, Intelligence in the Modern World, p. 390.




In regard to the changeability of human nature, Dewey believes that
part of man which is instinctive cannot be changed. Instinctive human
nature consists of man's biological needs and emotions."^ Only the ways
55
in which instincts are manifested can be changed. The channels that
the fixed constituents of human natiare take 6u*e dependent tpon social con¬
ditions .
If human nature is unchangeable, then there is no
such thing as education and ai i our efforts to
educate are doomed to failure. For the very mean¬
ing of education is modification of the native
humaui nature in formation of those new ways of
thinking, of feeling, of desiring, and-of believing
that eire foreign to raw hTunan nataire.5°
d. Human Nature and Conduct
Conduct and morality, for Dewey, are two sides of the same coin. He
57
is concerned with morality as it is concerned with controlling human nature.
In this connection, he believes in the relativity of "good” and of "value.'i
"Good" is measiired in terms of consequences and consequences fix the
morality of an act. His psychology of human conduct is elaborate. Much
of human conduct is a resxilt of habit, he says. Habits are patterns of
action with organic structure. "Ihe social environment^',' says Dewey, "acts
through native iupulses and speech, and moral habitudes manifest themselves."^®
^^Dewey, "Does Human Nature Change?" in Problems of Men (New York,
19^6), ch. 6. .
^^Ibid., pp. 242-244.
^®Ibid., p. 243.




"Habit” is a key term in his theory of conduct. It is an automatic
course of action. And since it is a result of cultural conditioning, it
is the cultural conditions which must be engaged to effect a chemge in
habits. Unless a man has a conc^t of what good is or what good meeins, emd
what it entails, nothing is accomplished by telling him to "be good". To
paraphrase Dewey, this is like the principle of magic found -whenever it
is hoped to get resiilts -without intelligent control of means."The
fire csui be put out only by changing objective conditions...."^® In fact,
Dewey insists that the formation of ideas as -well as their execution de¬
pends upon habit.
If we could form a correct idea without a correct
habit, then possibly -we could carry it out ir¬
respective of habit. But a wish definitely is
formed only in connection with an idea, and an
idea gets shape and consistency only when it has
a habit back of it. Only when a man can already
perform an act of standing straight does he know
what it is to have right posture and only when
it has a habit back of it.°^
Ideas are not spontaneously generated. They depend upon ovur pre¬
conceptions, "upon prior experience", says Dewey.
Reason pure of all influences from prior habit is
a fiction. But pure sensations out of which ideas
C8ua be framed apart from habit are equally ficti¬
tious, the sensations and ideas which are the
'stuff' of thought and purpose are alike affected
by habits manifested in the acts which give rise






out a definitive sensory element in any field is
evidence of a high degree of previoiis training, that is
of well-formed habits. A moderate account observation
of a child will suffice to reveal that even such gross
discriminations as black, white, red, green are the
result of some years of active deeJ-ings with things
in the course of which habits have been set up. It
is not such a siiEple matter to have clean-cut sensa¬
tion, latter is a sign of training, skill,
habit.
The view that mental habits can be straightened out by a manipulation with¬
out reference to the distortions of sensations and perception due to bad
bodily sets is ah erroneovis one, Dewey maintains. The other side of the
same error, he holds, is that it is only necessary to locate a paurticular
diseased cell or local reason, independent of the whole complex of
organic habits,in order to rectify conduct.
To grasp the fact that means are intermediates-middle terms, is "to
have done with the ordinary dualism of means and ends",^^ His ®octrine
of the unity of means and ends avers that:
The 'end' is merely a series of acts viewed at a
remote state; and a means is merely the series
viewed at an earlier one. The distinction of
means and ends arises in siirveyixxg the course of
proposed line of action, connection series in
time. The 'end' is the last act thought of; the
means are the acts to be performed prior to it
in time. To reach an end, we must take our mind
off from it and attend to the act which is next
to be performed. We must make that the end. The
only exception to this statement is in the case









Means and ends are the two names for the same reaility. Qhe terms denote
not a division in reality but a distinction in judgment.
'End* is the name for a series of acts taken collec-
tively-like the term army. 'Means' is a name for
the same series taken distrihutlvely-like this
soldier, that officer.
Moral philosophy should take into consideration the projective force
of habit and the inplication of habits on one another. A unified deed
should not be separated into two disjoined parts, namely, the motive euid
the act, as some theories do. According to Dewey, there are two facts
which limit emd define a moral situation.
One is that consequences fix the moral quality of
an act. The other is that upon the whole or in
the long run but not unqualifiedly, consequences
are what they sure^because of the nature of desire
and disposition.®®
Habits govern the nature of desire and disposition.
The habit is so constructed, so deeply entrenched in this human per-
sonsility, and so stable that rapid sweeping social changes are hardly possi~
ble, Dewey says.
A socieQ. revolution may effect abrupt and deep
alterations in external customs in legeO. and
politiceil institutions. But...the habit of
thought and feeling are not so easily modified.
They persist and insensibly ass^ilate to them¬
selves the outer innovation....®^
Habits of thoxxght outlive modifications in habits of overt action. Social





expectation, of judgment, of attendant emotional disposition and of "like
and dislike"°° do not modify easily once they have taken shape. That is
why the moral effects of even great political revolutions, Dewey tells
us, "do not show themselves till after the lapse of years. A new genera¬
tion must come upon the scene whose habits of mind have been formed under
the new conditions. Education is one of the means through which the
modification of habits takes place.
4. Knowledge and Intelligence
Dewey has a biological theory of knowledge and intelligence. By that
we mean that "thinking" for Dewey begins when there is tension between the
organism and his environment which he calls a problematic situation.
In Logic; The Theory of Inquiry, Dewey differentiates between know¬
ledge and intelligence. He maintains that the individual uses intelligence
to inquire into the problematic sitioation, to determine the nature of
alternatives of action and to make a choice between alternatives based T:q)on
his observations. Knowledge, for Dewey, is ein abstract term for "outcomes
of inquiry." "It can only be a generalization of the properties discovered
to belong to conclusions which are the outcome of inquiry."'^® "Experimental
knowing"^^ is doing, having, and being; it is conceiving and perceiving
certain relationships in experience. Dewey says that;
The value of any cognitive conclusion depends upon
the method by which it is reached so that the
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
"^^John Dewey, Logic; The Theory of Inquiry (New York, 1938)^ PP* 8-9.
^^John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York, 1929P« 201.
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perfecting of method-the perfecting of intelligence,
is the thing of supreme value.
He often uses the term "intelligence” synonymously with inquiry. By inquiry,
he means, the application of the scientific method to the solution of
problems, including social ones. He asserts that "inquiry is the life
blood of every science, end is constantly employed in every art, craft
and profession.
The conception by which we think scientific objects
are derived neither from sense nor from a priori
conceptions, but through setting up problems for
investigation and through the resolution of such
problems by reflective thought. Reflective
thought is, thinking that involves inference and
judgment.T^^
"Experimental knowing" through "e^erimental inquiry" signifies
directed activity-doing something which varies the conditions under which
objects are observed and directly related, and by instituting new arrange¬
ments among them. The selection of operations to be performed in
75
directed activity will depend upon the nature of the problem at hand.
Perhaps an inclusive summary of what Dewey means by experimental inquiry
is the enployment of intelligence in reflective thinking as "the purpose¬




Dewey, op. cit., p. 9«
74
Dewey, qp. cit., ch. 5»
'^^Ibid.
"^^Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 51-
CHAPTER II
THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE STATE
A. The Facts of Activity
Dewey postulates the heginning of the state in what he calls the
"facts of activity." It is an objective fact, he asserts, that "hiiinan
acts have consequences upon others, and that some of these consequences
are perceived."^ "Their perception leads to subsequent effort to control
p
action so as to secure some consequences and avoid others." There are,
it appears, two kinds of activity for Dewey, private and public.^ It is
in the natiire of public activity that we find the essence of his theory
of the origin and nattire of the state. He tells us that:
when indirect consequences eire recognized and there
is effort to regulate them, something having the
traits of a state comes into existence.^
The question which one wants answered at this point is on what basis can
we distinguish public from private activity? Dewey’s answer is:






the line hetween private and public is to be drawn on
the basis of the extent and scope of the consequences
of acts which are so important as to need control,
whether by inhibition or by promotion.5
He further postulates that the state has not always existed but
derives from an early history, when the right of self-help obtained.^
It is a common place that legal agencies for
protecting the persons and properties of members
of a community, and for repressing wrongs which they
suffer, did not always exist. Legal institutions
derive from an earlier period when the right of
self help obtained. If a person was harmed, it was
strictly up to him what he should do to get even.
Injuring another and exacting penalty for an
injiiry received were private transactions. They
were the affairs of those who were directly con¬
cerned and nobody else's direct business. But
the injured party obtained readily the help of
friends and relatives, and the aggressor did
likewise. Hence, consequences of queurrels did
not remain confined to those immediately con¬
cerned. Feuds ensued, and the blood-quarrels might
in5)licate large numbers and endure for generations.
The recognition of this extensive and lasting
embroilment and the harm, wrought by it to whole
families brought a public into existence.... Those
indirectly affected formed a public which took
steps to conserve its interest by Instituting
con?)Osltion and other means of pacification to
localize the trouble.
The facts are simple and familiar, but they
seem to present in embryonic form the traits
that define a state, its agencies and officers.^
B. The State: Its Origin and Nat\ire
In our presentation of Dewey's theory of the origin and nature of the
state, we are paying particular attention to his book. The Public and Its





his theory. Dewey asserts that we do not look for the state in "state-forming
forces." "Such theories merely reduplicate, in a causal force, the effects
Q
to he accotinted for."°
Natvirally endowed causal forces are themselves physio¬
logical tendencies which have previoxasly been shaped
into habits of action and expectation by means of
the very social conditions they are supposed to ex¬
plain. 9
In the above passage, Dewey is criticizing traditional political philosophy
10
such as that of Aristotle, Plato, Hegel, Kant, etc. His approach is as
follows:
We take then our point of departure from the objective
fact that human acts have consequences upon others,
that some of these consequences are perceived and
that their perception leeids to subsequent effort to
control action so as to secure some consequences and
avoid others.^
According to Dewey, "The state is the political organization of human
12
relationships." "Conjoint, combined, associated action is a imiversal
trait of the behavior of things.Such action has results.This is
another way in which otir author says that human acts have consequences.
He goes on to say that
some results of hxoman collective action are perceived,
that is, they are noted in such a way that they are



















measures and means to secure consequences which
are liked and eliminate those which are fotuad
obnoxious.^5
Here Dewey is in the process of explaining how the public comes into
existence. He defines the public according to its coniposition. The
public consists of all those \dio are affected by indirect consequences
of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have
l6
those consequences systematically C8u:ed for. It is from the public
that the state comes into being. The state appears when common interest
is generated by the perception of consequences. Dewey asserts that those
"affected by the consequences are perforce concerned in conduct of all
17
those who along with themselves share in bringing about the result."
When this happens the public comes into existence.
The public is organized and made effective by means
of representatives who are guardians of customs, as
legislators and executives, judges etc, care for its
especial Interest by methods intended to regulate
the conjoint action of individuals and groups.
The characteristic of the public as a state springs from the fact
that 1 modes of association may have extensive and enduring consequences
which involve others beyond those directly engaged in them. Because of
the extensiveness of consequences, people cannot readily prefigure how







intervenes in their behalf.
It is not merely that the combined observations of
a ntimber cover more ground than those of a single
person. It is rather that the public itself, being
unable to forecast and estimate all consequences,
establishes certain dikes and channels so that
actions are confined within prescribed limits, and
insofar have moderately predictable consequences.
Dewey calls his explanation of the origin and nature of the state a
21"generic account." There have been countless forms of joint activity
with corresponding diverse consequences. There have also been, he holds,
many forms of states. A particular state seeks that form of organization
which is most effective for the protection of the interests shared by its
members. This search for effectiveness in the formation of states must,
in Dewey's view, be "an experimental process."^ A good state is subjected
to tests of the degree to 'which its officials are so constituted as to
perform their function of caring for public interest, and the degree of
organization of the public.Dewey asserts that the plurality of states
is an obvious fact.
The notion of an inherent tiniversality in the asso¬
ciative force at once breaks against the obvious






its boundaries, limitations, its indifference and
even hostility to other states.
”The source of the public is found in the perception of consequences;
special agencies are established to care for and regulate these
consequences."^^ And it is in the performance of the latter that we are
able to distinguish the traits or marks of anythiiag called a state.
One such trait is "temporal and geographical localization." Dewey
recognizes that there are other kinds and forms of human associations
which do not have the character of a public. He acknowledges that:
There are associations which are too narrow and
restrictive in scope to give rise to a public,
just as there Eire associations too isolated from one
Einother to fall, within the same public.
Examples of associations \diich are too smsill are those 'vdiich have Immediate
contiguity, face-to-face relationships, eind have consequences which generate
a community of interests too direct and vital to occasion the need for
pfl
political organization.'^^ At the other extreme are social groups which






and "have no common interest, no public and no need nor possibility of
an inclusive state."Somewhere between associations that are narrow,
close and intimate and those which are so remote as to have only infre¬
quent and casual contact lies the province of the state," we are told by
Dewey,
We do not find eind should not ejqject to find sharp
and fast demarcations. Villages and neighborhoods
shade interceptibly into a political public. Dif¬
fering states may pass through federations and
alliances into a larger whole vdiich has some of
the marks of statehood.-^
C. Function of Political Institutions
In Dewey’s analysis of the state, he found one constant factor, viz,,
"the function of caring for and regulating the interests which accrue as
the result of the conplex indirect expansive radiation of conjoint behavior.
This, according to our author, is a basic function of political institutions
Let us see what these functions involve. The state is concerned with
OO
"modes of behavior which are old and hence well established, engrained.
Here is one of Dewey's examples.
An individual may make his own track in the forest;
but highways are usually public concerns. Without
roads which one is free to use at will men might








of transit and communication affect not only those
who utilize them hut all who are d^endent in any
way upon what is transported, whether as producers
or consumers.
There is psychological support for the tendency to put what is old and
established in uniform lines under the regulations of the state, main¬
tains Dewey.
Habits economize intellectual as well as muscular
energy. They relieve the mind from thought of means,
thus freeing thought to deal with new conditions and
purposes. Moreover, interference with a well esta¬
blished habit is followed by \ineasiness and antipathy.
The efficiency of liberation from attention to what¬
ever is regularly recurrent is reenforced-by an
emotional tendency to get rid of bother.’®
Another function which Dewey attributes to the state is that of
making children and other dependents (such as the insane, the permanently
helpless, etc.) its wards.
When the parties involved in any transaction eire unequal
in status, the relationship is likely to be onesided,
and the interests of one party to suffer. If the conse¬
quences appear serious, especially if they are to be
irretrievable the public brings to bear a weight that
will eqiialize conditions. Legislatures are more ready
to regulate the hours of labor of children than of adults,
of women than of men. In general, labor legislation is
justified against the charge that it violates liberty of







of the parties to the arrangement are so desperate
that the conditions of a genuine contract are absent;
action by the state is introduced to form a level on
which bargaining takes place.
Dewey also notes that there has been a steady tendency for the education
of children to be regarded as properly a state charge, in spite of the
fact that children are primarily the care of a family. He says that:
A certain measure of instruction and training is
deemed to have significant consequences for the
social body, rules are laid down affecting the
action of parents in relation to their children,
emd those who are not parents are taxed...to
maintain schools.39
In siuranary, we may note that Dewey says that it is the function of
the state "to set a formal seal upon forces alreeuJy in operation by giving
„40
them a defined cheuinel through which to act." The state is a distinctive
and secondary form of association, "having specifiable work to do and
specifiable organs of operation."Most states after they have been
hp
brought into being react upon the primary groupings."
When a state is a good state, when the officers
of the public genuinely serve the public interests,
this reflex effect is of great importance. It
renders the desirable associations solider Eind
more coherent; indirectly it clarifies their aims
and purges their activities. It places discount
upon injurious groupings and renders their tenvire
of life precarious. In performing these services,
it gives the individual members of valued asso¬








them of hampering conditions which if they had to
cope with personsilly, would absorb their energies
in mere negative struggle against evils. It enables
individual members to count with reasonable certainty
upon what others will do, and thus facilitate mutually
helpful cooperation.^’
D. Legal Agencies
One of the chief institutional agencies with which Dewey deals is law.
He defines "law” as:
The institution of conditions under which persons
make their arrangements with one another. They
are structures which canalize action; they are
active forces only as the banks which confine the
flow of a stream, and are commands only in the
sense in which the banks command the current.
Men are naturally shortsighted, and the short-
si^tedness is increased and perverted by the
influence of appetite and passion. ’The Law'
formulates remote and long run consequences....
It is a means of doing for a person what other¬
wise only his own foresight, if thoroughly
reasonable, could do.... It is necessarily a
generalization; for it is generic as to the lq
predictable consequences of a class of facts. ^
"Legal srulesy Dewey says, "state certain conditions, which \dien met make
an agreement a contract.Law is as reasonable as a man la sensible
who selects and arranges conditions eidapted to produce the ends he regards
as desirable. "It is a means of doing for a person what otherwise he








Another legal agency discussed by Dewey is that of the public official
or representative. It is through this agency that the public articulates
48
and becomes a state, notes our author.
A public articulated and operating through represen¬
tative officials is the state; there is no state
without a goveiwent, but also there is none with¬
out the public. ^
The selection of officieul representatives and the definition of responsibi¬
lities and rights constitute one of the primary problems of the public,
according to Dewey. That problem is "how to counteract the forces that
have so leurgely determined the possession of rule by accidental and irre¬
levant factors,*^'and "how to counteract the tendency to employ political
50
power to seirve private instead of public ends."''^
E. Analysis and Criticisms
Dewey has given us what he calls a "generic account" of the origin and
nature of the state. He asserts that his account is not of "the state" but
of states in partic\xlar. In his view, there are no patterns in \diich all
states must fit. Stages through which states must pass are also nonexistent
in Dewey's account. The constant factor in his account is the ability
of human beings to perceive the "facts of activity." This is a necessau:*y
ingredient of all states. People must, according to Dewey, notice sequence
in human acts in order to perceive consequential relationships in associa¬
tive behavior.
^Ibid., p. 56.
^^Ibld., see pages 67-68 for further discussion.
^^Ibid., p. 83.
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Consequences are modified "by several variables, we are informed.
Intrusions from non-political internal occurrences, Industried, and tech¬
nological, and external events, borrowing, travel, migrations, explorations,
wars, all modify the consequences of preexisting associations.^^ Political
associations are eQ.so subject to alteration by development of better methods
of thinking which %ring observation of consequences which were incapable
of being conceived from a vision which used coarser intellectual tools.
1. The Meaning eind Nature of Consequences
The term "consequences" occurs frequently throughout most of Dewey's
works. His use of the term carries more in^ilicatlons with it than ordinary
usage. For Instance, Dewey holds that "consequences are definite, obser¬
vable facts which the individual can be made responsible for noting and
for employing in the direction of further behavior.""^-' Moreover, consequences
are his test of morality. He asserts that "morality is found in consequences."
In oior examination we are using Bertrand Russell's inteipretation of
the term "consequences" in Dewey's Philosophy. Bertrand Russell afflnns
that Dewey judges a belief by its effects.^^ Russell argues that:
Generalizing, we may say that Dr. Dewey, like every¬
one else, divides beliefs into two classes, of
which one is good and the other is bad. He holds,





Dewey, Ethics (New York, I908), p. 234.
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Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York, 1945)#
p. 826.
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and bad at another; this happens with imperfect theories
which are better than their predecessors but worse than
their successors. Whether a belief is good or bad depends
upon whether the activities which it inspires in the organism
entertaining the belief have consequences which are satis¬
factory or \ansatisfactory to it. Thus a belief about some
event in the past is to be classified as 'good* or 'bad',
not according to whether the event really took place, but
according to the future effects of the belief.”
"The results" of Dewey's theory "are curioiis," Rxissell points out.^^
Suppose somebody says to me: 'Did you have coffee with
yo\ir breakfast this morning?' If I am an ordinary person,
I shall try to remember. But if I am a disciple of Dr.
Dewey I shall say: 'Wait a while; I must try two experi¬
ments before I can tell you.' I shall then first make
myself believe that I had coffee, and observe the conse¬
quences, if any.. I shall then conpare the two sets of
consequences, to see which I found the more satisfactory.
If there is a balance on one side I shall decide for
that answer. If there is not, I shall have to confess
that I cannot answer the question.^'
O
"But this is not the end of our troubles," says Russell.^ He further
alleges that:
How am I to know the consequences of believing that
I had coffee for breakfast? If I say 'the conse¬
quences eire such-£ind-such, '• this in turn will have
to be tested by its consequences before I can know
whether what I have said was a 'good' or a 'bad'
statement. And even if this difficulty were over¬
come, how am I to judge which set of consequences
is the more satisfactory? One decision as to
whether I had coffee may fill me with contentment,
the other with determination to fvtrther the war






but until I have decided which is better I can
not tell whether I had coffee for breakfast.
Surely this is absurd.
The difficulty in Dewey's position of judging beliefs by their conse¬
quences is that past occurrences play no part. According to Russell,
Dewey's view is that;
The past cannot be eiffected by what we do, and there¬
fore, if truth is determined by what has happened, it
is independent of present or future volitions; it
represents, in logical form, the limitations on human
power. But if tinth, or rather 'wairanted asserta-
bility,' depends upon the future, then, in so far as
it is in our power to alter the futiure, it is in our
power to alter what should be asserted.
Based on Dewey's belief in human power and his unwillingness to admit
"stubborn facts" - facts which cannot be manipulated, Russell has classi¬
fied Dewey's philosophy as a power philosophy.
Dr. Dewey's world, it seems to me, is one in which
human beings occupy the imagination; the cosmos of
astronomy, though of course acknowledged to exist,
is at most times ignored. His philosophy is a
power philosophy, though not, like Nietzche's, a
philosophy of individual power; it is the power
of the community that is felt to be valuable. It
is this element of social power that seems to me
to meike the philosophy of instrumentalism attrac¬
tive to those who are more inpressed by our new
control over natural forces than by the limita¬







Furthermore, Russell declares that Dewey's theory which judges morality
in terms of "consequences" contributes to "the intoxication of power
which invaded philosophy with Fichte, and to which modern men, whether
philosophers or not, are prone."^3 "i am," he says, "persuaded that
64
intoxication is the greatest dsinger of o\ir time." "And...any philosophy
which, however unintentionally, contributes to it is increasing the






A. Democracy As A Way of Life
Dewey's commitment to democracy as a moral ideal is perhaps implicit
throughout his entire philosophy and it is ejqplicit in much of it. He
often uses the term "free society" and "scientific society" interchange¬
ably with democracy. Our author views democracy as a personcQ., em indivi¬
dual way of life. It is a form of day-to-day living which embodies
certain beliefs about human nature, such as the realization of the poten¬
tialities of man, faith in human intelligence and the power of pooled and
cooperative experience, etc. Democracy as a way of life meJces use of the
freedom of inquiry^ that is exhibited in the natural sciences and in
all of the social aspects of culture. It also allows every mature human
being to participate in the formation of values under which he must live
as a group.
The keynote of democracy as a way of life may be
expressed, it seems to me, as the necessity for
the participation of every mat\ire human being
in the formation of the values that regulate the
Vohn Dewey, Freedom and Culture (New York, 1939) ^ ch. 1.
2
John Dewey, Ethics (New York, 1908), ch. 25, pp. 555-558.
3john Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York, 1920), pp. 173-lT^*
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living of men together; -which is necessary from the
standpoint of both the general welfare and the full
development of human beings as individuals.
In the sense that its final limits have been neither completed nor
perfected, democracy is an ideal. De-wey tells us that "since things do
not attain such fulfillment but are in actuality distracted and interfered
■with, democracy, in a sense, is not a fact and never will be."^ Democracy,
for Dewey, is the only truly human way of living. It is simply the
best means that human wit has devised up to a special time in history for
7
realizing the potentialities in human nature. He believes that, no
matter what the native make-up of human nature;
Its -working activities, those which respond to
institutions and rules and which finally shape
the pattern of the latter, are created by the
whole body of occupations, interests, skills,
beliefs that constitute a given culture.®
According to De-wey's asstimption that an open society which -will
allow for free scientific inquiry is good, democracy is the only
truly human -way of living because the whole of a given culture is
being developed.^ Democracy is in accord -with his view of the
^John Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration," Problems of
Men (New York, 1946), p. 58*
John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York, 1946), p. l48.
John Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration," Problems of
Men, p. 56.
'^Ibid.
®John De-wey, Freedom and Culture, p.
^Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration," Problems of Men,
pp. 58-59-
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xmiverse as an open one vith no fixed ends. In the universe there is
democracy among existences, "both celestial and terrestial. There is no
one existence worthy of being elevated to superior rank over others unless
it is man, according to one of Dewey's critics.^® This principle is
demonstrated in "the necessity for the participation of every mature human
being in the formation of values.
Dewey asserts that "the heart of democracy is in the free gathering
of neighbors on the street comer to discuss back and forth what is read
12
in uncensored news of the day...." Intolerance, abuse, and name-calling
because of difference of opinion, according to Dewey, is treason to the
13
democratic way of life. Democracy, as a way of life, is controlled by
"personal faith in personal day-to-day working together with others.
Even when needs and ends of consequences eu:e different for each individual
"coc^eration is a priceless addition to life."^^ our author postulates
that "a democratic society is one in which free inquiry, free assembly, and
n 6
free communication are guaranteed."'^
•
^®W8Q.do Prank, "Our Leaders," New Republic, June 30, 1928, pp. Il4-ll6.
^^Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration," Problems of Men,
p. 58.
^John Dewey, "Creative Democracy-The Task Before Us," The Philosopher




^^Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration," Problems of Men,
p. 58.
^^Dewey, "Creative Democracy - The Task Before Us," The Philosopher
of the Common Man, p. 222.
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The democratic ideal of freedom is not the right of
each individual to do as he pleases...the basic
freedom is that of freedom of mind and of whatever
degree of freedom of action and experience is
necessary to produce freedom of intelligence. The
modes of freedom guaranteed by the bill of rights
are all of this nature; freedom of belief and con¬
science, of expression of opinion, of assembly for
discussion and conference, of press, as organ of
conmunication...^7
1. Historical Development of Democracy
Democracy was a more or less accidental occxirrence due to fortunate
l8
circumstances and men, Dewey asserts. In one place he locates the
historical development of democracy in "Hellenic humanism," in "Christian
beliefs" and "all conscious and unconscious movements to attain freedom.
"...the unity of the democratic movement is found in effort to remedy evils
experienced in consequence of prior political institutions...."^® Still
another work of Dewey's maintains that the essence of democracy is located
in the unification of the Greek and Medieval ideals. "The former used the
industry of the many to free the higher life-art, government, science - of
21
a few." The latter, he says, "recognized the moreil value of industry
22
in relation to character." Thus Dewey postulates that the modem
conscience "resting back upon a higher appreciation of human dignity and
worth is seeking to work out a social and economic order that shall combine











Although Dewey considers democracy largely a product of fortunate
circumstances, he acknowledges that men acting in these circumstances helped
bring democracy about. He attributes to Jefferson the first modem state¬
ment of the ideals of democracy. Jefferson stated the principles of
24
democracy in human terms.
Jefferson's formulation is moral through and through;
in its foundations, its methods, its ends. The heart
of his faith is expressed in his words 'nothing is un¬
changeable but inherent and inalienable rights of man.'
The words in -vdiich he stated the moral basis of free
institutions have gone out of vogue.*..To put ourselves
in touch with Jefferson's position, we have therefore
to translate...'natural' into moral.^5
Jefferson, Dewey says, was under the influence of Deism at the time, how¬
ever, he asserts that:
His fxmdamental beliefs remain unchanged in substance
if we forget all special associations with the word
nature and speak instead of ideal aims and values
to be realized, aims which, although ideals,are not
located in the clouds but are backed by something
deep and indestructible in the needs and demands of
humankind.
■While giving credit to Jefferson for formulating this democratic ideal in
human terms and also for uniting theoiy with practice in the American
e3q>eriment with democracy, he still believes that fundamentally, the
"victory of democracy, was won in a more or less external and accidental
manner.
^3ibid.





2, Interrelationship of Democratic Institutions
The interrelationship of institutions in a society might be viewed
as another method of Dewey’s for rejecting the separation of phenomena
in nature. This is a further step toward eliminating dualisms that may
exist in trying to separate the individual from his environment. "Social
events are products of Interaction of human nature with cultural condi-
tions^" he tells us. In Freedom and Culture^ Dewey is concerned with
the crucial problem of how to achieve social events that produce a free
29
culture. This problem is a resultant one which arises after he has
considered the problem of "what sort of social results we supremely
30
want." The essence of his answer to the latter problem is that we
want the results which eire produced by a free culture, viz., the absence
of externally controlled institutions or those subjected to arbitrary
31
power from a society.
Dewey maintains that conscious effort must now be made to sustain
by deliberate and intellectual endeavor "what was achieved more or less
32accidentally."”^ He asserts that:
The struggle for democracy has to be maintained on










^^Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration," Problems of Men,
pp. 59-60.
^^Dewey, Freedom and Culture, p. 173*
33Ibid., p. 175*
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Demcxsracy can be served only by the slow day-by-day adoption and
contagious diffusion in every phase of our "common life" of methods
34
that are identical with the ends to be reached. Dewey infonns us
that:
The way in which any organized social interest is
controlled necessarily plays an inportant part in
forming the dispositions and tastes, the attitudes,
interests, purposes and desires, of those engaged
in carrying on the activities of the group. For
illustration I do not need to do more than point
to the moral, emotional and intellectusd. effect
upon both entployer and laborers of the existing
industrial system. Just what the effects speci¬
fically are is a matter about which we know very
little, but I suppose that everyone who reflects
upon the subject admits that it is impossible
that the ways in which activities are carried on
for the greater part of the waking hours of the
day, and the way in which the shares of indivi¬
duals are involved in the management of affairs
in such a matter as gaining a livelihood and
attaining material and social security, can only
be a highly Inportant factor in shaping personal
dispositions, in short, forming character and
intelligence.35
Moreover, Dewey notes that institutions in society are interrelated
in producing a free culture because they all have an educationeil function.
He uses "educational" in the sense that institutions operate to form
attitudes, dispositions, abilities and disabilities that constitute a
concrete human personality.The state as the politicsil organization
of human relationships is influenced by the industrial and technological
development which a cult\xre has reached. It is also influenced by the
^^Ibid., pp. 175-176.





habits, ideals and values of a cult^lre.
B. Democracy as a Political System
Political democracy is more of an effect than a cause in Dewey's
thinking. "It represents the convergence of a great number of social
movements which had nothing to do with the eventual outcome.Born
in revolt against established forms of government, the events •vdiich
finally culminated in its establishment were the result of fear of
government and "the desire to reduce it to a minimum so as to limit
39
the evils it could do...." Dewey informs us that the movement expressed
itself as an end in itself because of its negative import.
Thus it happened that the intellectixal terms in which
the movement expressed itself had a negative import
even when they seemed to be positive. Freedom pre¬
sented itself as an end in itself, though it signi¬
fied ^ fact liberation from oppression and tradi-
Dewey postulates that political democracy is a system of theories and
4l
practices regetrding the selection and behavior of public officials. They
are universal suffrage, recurring elections, and responsibility of those
42
who are in political power to the voters.
3'^Ibid.





Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration, Problems of Men,
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The essence of what Dewey means by political democracy is the responsibility
of power. It fits into his theory of the origin and nature of the state
as one of the forms which the public may take in its organization into
the state.
The ends of political democracy are many. They are functional.
Democracy aids in the realization of a free culture by institutionalizing
freedom of inquiry and expression, legal equality euad equality of oppor-
4'5
tunity for development, etc. This fosters the perpetuation of faith
in the dignity and worth of each individual in the culture.A democra-
45
tic society is a scientific society, according to Dewey. The methodology
of science is freely applied to social situations.
C. Analysis and Criticisms
Few criticisms have been made of Dewey's theory of the origin and
nature of the state. It seems to be consistent. It is in harmony, as far
as we can see, with the evidence of history. Dewey has a sense of history.
Morris Cohen avers that "as one who has been brought up in the humanistic
46
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4^Morris R. Cohen, "John Dewey and His School," American Ihought (Glencoe,
1954), p. 298.
Problems arise in the application of theory to practice. We wonder
about the possibility of the application of the cold, detached methodology
of science to the personal, social and moral realms of existence. Morris
Cohen, in his examination of Dewey's thought, along these lines concluded
that "hiunan intelligence is frail, pathetically Impotent in the face of
great physical stress, or vital impulse. Cohen says that in Recon¬
struction in Philosophy, Dewey's view is that "man is cepable, if he will
but exercise the required courage, intelligence and effort, of shaping
U8
his own fate. Physiceil conditions offered no insurmountable barriers."
But, Cohen declares.
If this were the case, why has not mankind exercised
its intelligence to remove the stupid cruelties
which deirken the lives of men and women in our day
as much as ever, in coiantries at peace as well as
those at war?^^
"So long as human beings lack omniscience," Cohen asserts, "they will
lack omnipotence and will therefore have to face insuperable difficulties
.,50
and evils. Moreover,
In^jortant as are the intellect\ial differences between
men, we are all of the same clay as the insane and
the criminal, even the most potent and enlightened








"Such reflections," says Cohen, "may be useless and unpleasant,
but no philosophy can claim to be the liberating truth unless it faces them
resolutely.He maintains that Dewey's theory of democracy, along with
his theory of intelligence, is misleading in that it minimizes "the incurable
evils which, in an inaperfect world, every child, of mortal man and woman
must face...."53
Cohen fixrther states that Dewey and his followers are "misled by
the phrase 'making the world a better place to live in,' which suggests
54
mastery of the environment rather than otir own desires." He holds
that:
As long as human desire outruns human cepacity, even
as the range of oiu: vision exceeds the field of our
reach, the way of happiness must include not only
the masteryj.pf natiire but also the mastery of our
own selves.
The latter, he maintains, "cannot be attained without the fearless exami¬
nation of the limitations of human capacity due to the fact that we live
in a world that is not expressly designed for htiman comfort.









There are no hooks in his universe which the soul
can call its own. It is full of the sense of men
hurrying to work, struggling against all sorts of
material difficulties and the stupid selfishness
of their fellow-beings, and finally succeeding
by dint of superior Intelligence in the manipu¬
lation of things. It is pervaded also by a noble
indignation that there should be so many parasitic
idlers and unused places, so much class exploita¬
tion. His writings which emphasize the ertistlc
impulse have begun to. show a sense of the natural
sunlight and open fields, wherein even now the
children of men sometimes play in utter abandon.
But as yet there is no sense in it of the loneli¬
ness of the individual human soul, facing the
indifferent eeirth, sea, of sky, or the eternal
procession of the stars that ever mock man's
vain pretension to exalt himself as the master
of the universe.
Cohen's position is that "we in America are especially in need of reali¬
zing that perpetual motion is not the blessed life and that the hustlers
may not be the only ones, nor perhaps even the first, to enter the kingdom
of heaven.
This is not an argument against the necessity of
effort and work. But we can still afford a doubt
about any moral system that is too social and does
not recognize the just claims of rest, of vacations
from the strenuous human scene and its brutal
struggles. Like other Intellectual workers the
philosopher must break away from the crowd, even
as Jesus, filled with compassion for the multitude,
retired alone to the mountain to pray. Why shotild
philosophy deny us any private nook in this wide







THE ETHICAL POUimATIONS OF DMOCRACY
Dewey vindicates his theory of democracy on naturalistic grounds.
In his defense of democracy, his moral, social and political philosophies
converge into a thoroughgoing philosophical system. Essentially, Dewey
is a moralist. He is chiefly concerned with the socieQ. well-being of
man in his environment. Man, we are reminded by our author, has
biological as well as cultural constituents in his make-up. Nature gives
him a capacity for development which culture acts upon in the ongoing
process of experience. The individual begins thinking in the resolution
of a perplexity.^ This perplexity is brought on when he is at odds with
his environment. Democracy enters the picture as the institutionalization
of certain principles which facilitate the resolution of tension between
man and his environment emd make the universe a more comfortable place in which
to live. The experimentation so cheuracteristic of modern science is
applied to the social environment in democracy.
In this chapter we are concerned with how democracy aids in making
the universe a more comfortable place in which to live. Here we address
ourselves to Dewey's answer to the question of what makes democracy desirable
as a way of life.
^John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York, 1929), P« 226.
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His answer is in5)licit in the ethical principles which underlie his theory
of democracy. These principles are: (l) Freedom for the release of poten¬
tialities in h\mian natvure; (2) Belief in the dignity and worth of the
individual; (3) Belief in human capacities for intelligent judgment and
action and (4) Belief in the power of collective intelligence and shared
experience.
A. Freedom For The Release of Potentialities in Human Nature
Freedom is one of the foundational principles in Dewey's theory of
democracy. Freedom is largely defined as the release of the capacities
of human nature. Dewey's natiiralistic philosophy holds that "culture
2
determines the arrangement of the native constituents of human nature,"
and democratic culture provides for free development of these native con¬
stituents of human nature.^ "If we want the individual to be free, we
must,” according to Dewey, "see to it that suitable conditions exist.
Suitable conditions are those adapted to the emancipation of personeil
capacities, and to the securing of each individual, an effective right to
count in the order and movement of society.5
In itself, freedom is a generic term which implies freedom from
something and freedom for something. For Dewey, it is freedom for the
release of human potentialities or capacities. The moral criterion by
p






which Dewey would test social institutions embodies the principle of preparing
'suitable conditions for freedom.'
The test is whether a given custom or law sets free
individual capacities in such a way as to make them
available for the development of the general happi¬
ness or the common good.°
This raises the problems of identifying human potentialities. In
effect, Dewey tells us that the latter are indigenous to the individual
and cannot be known except in a free society where everyone is allowed to
7
develop whatever talent he has. This is one of the functions of democracy,
to provide suitable conditions for the release of human capacities. Dewey
identifies these capacities as man's educability, his power to learn. By
this he means "the suffusion of his present moment in the form of symbols
8
of the shape of things to come." Our author has great faith in the
capacity of human beings for intelligent judgment and action and asserts
it as one of his principal foundations of democracy. This assertion will
be discussed in a later section.
B. The Dignity and Worth Of The Individual
Another cornerstone of Dewey's defense of the desirability of demo-
Q
cracy is belief in the "common man." This, according to Dewey, means
there is faith in the potentialities of hiaman nature as that nature is
exhibited in every human being "irrespective of race, color, sex, birth and
^John Dewey, Ethics (New York, 1908), pp. 482-483.
^John Dewey, "Democracy and Ekiucational Administration," Problems of
Men (New York, 1946), p. 6l.
Q
°John Dewey, "Creative Democracy-The Task Before Us," The Philosopher




family, or material or ciiltural wealth."^® Its embodiment is in the
democratic principle of equality, he holds.
The democratic faith in hiaman equality is belief that
every hiunan being, independent of the quality or
range of his personal endowment, has the right to
equaJ. qpporttinity with every other person for deve¬
lopment of whatever gift he has.^^
12
The element of equality in the "democratic credo" is equality
in the sense that all individuals are entitled to equal treatment by law
and its administration. It eO-SO means equality of opportxinity to deve-
l4
lop their natviral capacities and to satisfy their own needs. In Dewey’s
line of thinking,
everything -vdiich forbids freedom and fullness of
communication sets up barriers that divide human
beings into sets and cliques, into antagonistic
sects and factions and thereby undermines the
democratic way of life.^^
C. Human Capacities for Intelligent Judgment and
Action, and Collective Intelligence
Democracy, maintains Dewey, is based on "faith in the capacity of
intelligence in the 'common man' to respond with 'common sense' to the
free play of facts and ideas.The very essence of democracy lies in
^Qlbid., pp. 223-224.












17the free play of conflicting opinions, he tells us. ‘ Another expression
of hviman intelligence Euid action is the pooling of experience in a coopera¬
tive effort. The underlying principle in this respect is the "in5>ortance
1 Q
of e3q)erience in the ongoing process." Our author asserts that democracy
is belief in the ability of human ejsperience to grow in ordered richness.
Democracy is the faith that the process of experience
is more in^jortant than any special results attained,
so that special results achieved are of ultimate
value only as they are used to enrich and order the
ongoing process.^9
That experience is capable of being educative is another basis of
democracy. E5^erienoe> Dewey defines as the free interaction of individual
human beings with siirrounding conditions, especially the human surroundings
which develop and satisfy needs and desire by increasing knowledge of
20
things as they are.
Crucial to our consideration of the ethical principles which nmke
democracy desirable is Dewey's theory of value and valuation. We have
already mentioned in Chapter I that "good" is a relative consideration for
Dewey. In line with his biological theory of knowledge and thinking, the
desirable is that which best aids in the resolution of the tension existing
21





^^Dewey, "The Field of Value," Value; A Cooperative Inquiry, ed., Ray
Lepley (New York, 19^9), passim.
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beca\ise it facilitates the resolution of tension through use of the experi¬
mental process used by science. Social arrangements are "mesins of creating
Op
individuals.” A scientific society is a valuable social arrangement
which provides for free development of hviman capacities for critical
intelligence.
What ought to be, in Dewey's view, is derived through critical intel¬
ligence. Value fulfills certain conditions'^ and Intelligence determines
the conditions to be satisfied. The human capacity for Intelligence is
2^
itself a "unique intrinsic good" -which De-wey asserts in laying the
foundations for the direction of the institutions of social life because
men are affected by them.^^ "No man or limited set of men is -wise or
»26
good enough to rule others -without their consent....
The individuals of the submerged mass may not be
very wise. But there is one thing they are wiser
about than anybody else can be, and that is where
the shoe pinches, the troubles they suffer from. '
^^Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York, 1920), p. 152.
^^Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 259-261.
pii
De-wey, "Democracy and Educational Administration," Problems of Men,
P. 59.
^^Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago, I926), p. 405.




The social good is a product of the visions and processes of reflection
of all people in the society, a process of collective intelligence. It is
produced by the freedom of all individuals to participate in the science
of making their ovn values and social experience. Values are tested,
enlarged and enriched through the process of sharing and communication of
28
experience. By this statement Dewey means, says J. H. Randall, the
transmutation of energies "into meanings which are appreciated and mutually
referred by each to every other on the part of those engaged in combined
action. Fulfillment is clearly one of the values of democracy to human
natiire juxtaposed to suppresion and negation. Fulfillment of those
capacities which each individual possesses inherent in his native physio¬
logical structure is the aim of democracy.
D. Analysis and Criticisms
That Dewey preferred democracy is clear. His theory of democracy is
well integrated into his systematic philosophy. Our major concern at
this point is with the validity of his assun^jtions about the values of
democracy. One recalls that values are functioneO. in Dewey's philosc^hy,
i. e., they are useful in helping to find solutions suitable to the social
^0
well-being of man. The value of something is always considered in the
light of "what it is good for."^^
28
J. H. Randall, Jr., "The Religion of Shared Experience," Philosopher
of the Common Man, pp. 106-l45.
^9ibid., p. 110.
3®D^wey, "The Field of Value,'' in Value; A Cooperative Inquiry, pp. 70-71
3^Ibid.
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Dewey asserts that the value of democracy lies in its application of
scientific methodology to the social, personal and moral realms. The
logical validity of this assertion depends upon the validity of assumptions
about the "goodness” of scientific methodology and its application to the ’
personal, social and moral realms. Samuel DuBois Cook argues that:
It would be insufficient to define the good in terms
of the scientific ideal and, in turn, to link demo¬
cracy to the scientific method, and then argue from
these sxQjpositions to the conclusion of the moral
validity of democracy. This would be simply a
matter of arbitrary definition which may be offset
by contrary definitions. If democracy is desirable
because science is valuable, then how are the ethical
predicates associated with science themselves vali- ^3
dated? Clearly, we must first know what the good is.
If one is going to reject universal stgindards of right and wrong, good
and bad, then one must defend the validity of the assumptions which one
34
makes in connection with normative accoxmts of "good." Cook avers that:
Logically...Immediate answers concerning the desira¬
bility of democracy such as 'that democracy is morally
valid because it alone is either consistent with or
derived from scientific method,' 'free inquiry,' 'hiiman
nature,' or the ongoing process of experiences, eure
ruled out. This would be inconclusive, inasmuch as
these phrases involve ethical asstinptions which them¬
selves stand in need of explicit fonnulation and
vindication.
^^Dewey, Freedom and Culture, pp. Yjh-YjG.
^^Samuel DuBois Cook, "An Inquiry into The Ethical Foundations of
Democracy" (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Political
Science, Ohio State University, 195^)# ch. 2, p. 203.
^^Cohen, "John Dewey and His School," American Thought, p. 29I.
35cook, OD. cit., p. 20k.
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Without proof of the "goodness” of science, authoritarianism could very-
well he affirmed, "it would he just as valid to assert the moral primacy
of authoritarianism because it denies the conipelling quality of these
norms."36
This chapter is concerned primarily with Dewey's norms for democracy.
Our findings may he summarized hy saying that: Democracy, Dewey holds,
provides freedom of the individual to develop his capacities for critical
Intelligence through the ongoing process of experience. Implicit in
this statement are several previously discussed assunptions. One is that
there are native capacities in human heings; two, these capacities are
capable of being developed; and three, experience is the educative proce®
through which capacities are developed. Experience is gained through the
ongoing process of experimentation and observation, of trial and error.
Lastly, the development of human capacity for experimental intelligence
is d desirable end. Morris Cohen observes that Dewey views nature as
just so much material to be transformed by otu:* intelligence.-^' Cohen
argues that by doing this, Dewey minimizes the incurable evils which man
must face in an inperfect -world.Our author, Cohen continues, tedces
these evils for granted and gives no explicit consideration to the part
OQ
they play in the whole of meua's life.-^^
3^Ibid.




In our discussion of the vsQ.ues of democracy or its desirability, we
cannot help but note with Cohen, that, although essentieilly a moralist,
kn
Dewey gives us no clear picture of what good is. Cohen raises the
question: "In trying to make the world better, what is the test as to
which of two alternatives is better?”^^ Instead of getting to the heart
of this problem, Cohen contends, Dewey gets around the issue by telling
k2
us how to choose between alternatives. The reason for this is:
He is so averse to the old classical formulas for
the summum bontun that made no particular difference
in special oases, that he falls back on a very naij^e
ethical atomism; every situation has its own good. ^
This Cohen asserts, ”is to dodge the whole difficulty.
When Dewey and his disciples insist that philosophy
must serve human weal and welfare, they assert
something which no other can or wishes to deny.
Conpassion for human suffering is at the bottom
of all that is noble in human effort. But the
significant question really is, wherein human
weal consist.
Dewey, without sufficiently vindicating his ethical norms-according to
Samuel DuBois Cook, has asserted the moral value of democracy as the best
means of achieving human weal and welfare. However, as Cook and Cohen














^^Ibid., also see Cook,
Democracy, “ ch. 2, pt. 2.
"An Inquiry Into The Ethical Foundations of
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
John Dewey is one of America's foremost contemporary philosophers.
The influence of his naturalistic-instxumentsQ. philosophy extends into
many areas, i.e., the social and moral, the educational, the aesthetic,
and the area of political theory. Dewey is essentially a moralist. He
is concerned with the social well-being of the individual and he proceeds
to develop a framework for choosing values according to their function
in aiding social well-being.^
Although Dewey is generally identified with pragmatism and instru¬
mentalism, d\iring the first fifteen or twenty years of his philosophical
2
career he was more of an ideeQ.ist than anything else. Morton White tells
us that he started his career with a study of Hegel.^ Dewey's broad edu¬
cation brought him into contact with Scottish philosophy, neo-Hegelian
philosophy, the experimental psychology of G. Stanley Hall and the pragma¬
tism of James Pierce. His philosophical thought was influenced by all of
^John Dewey, "The Field of Value" in Value; A Cooperative Inquiry,
ed., Ray Lepley (New York, 19^9)^ PP» .67-78^
^Morton White, The Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism (New York,
19^3)> see chs. 1, 2, and 3.
%orton White (ed.). The Age of Analysis (New York, 1955)> P* 173.
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the above elements. Although our major investigatory concern Is with
Dewey's political philosc^hy, we cannot avoid observing his broad and
total philosophic framework.
Dewey's political theory is iinportant because it is one of the first
thoroughgoing justifications of democracy on naturalistic grounds. He
sees democracy in the light of its instrumental value in helping to resolve
the tension between man and the universe. On the basis of this, Bertrand
5
Russell has classified Dewey's philosophy as a power philosophy. Democracy,
for Dewey, aids in helping man to develop the critical intelligence necessary
to bring the world under his thumb, i. e., to make the world a more com¬
fortable place for man to live in. Our author calls his theory of the
origin and nature of states generic. The origin depends upon the ability
of human beings to perceive antecedent and subsequent events. The nature
of states, for him, depends upon the degree of the development of collective
critical intelligence.^ Dewey postulated a theory of particular states. The
particular states which are his major interest are democratic states.
Our author locates the historical identification of democratic
7
states with Hellenic humanism and Christian beliefs. He holds that the
development of democracy was more or less accidental, depending upon a
k
White, The Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism, ch. 1.
^Bertrand Russell, "John Dewey," A History of Western Philosophy (New
York, 19^5), PP. 827-828..
^John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Chicago, 1946), pp. 12-17,
65-74.
^John Dewey, Freedom and Culture (New York, 1939)» PP* 172-173*
60
fortunate combination of circumstances and men. Moreover, he says,
"The democratic movement, although seemingly positive, actually had
negative import."^ Democracy, for Dewey, is an inclusive ideal and
system. Not only is it a form of political organization, it is a way
of living which permeates every institution of culture. It is an indi¬
vidual and social way of life.
The value of democracy is asserted by Dewey on the ground that it
is in harmony with science and the "scientific method," "free inquiry,"
and the development of critical intelligence.^*^ According to Cook,
Dewey's theory of democracy encounters logical stumbling blocks when
it vindicates the "goodness" of democracy on the ground that it is
harmonious with scientific aims.^^ This is so because the aims of science
12
themselves stand in need of vindication. Dewey does not sufficiently
justify his norms. What are the moral grounds and ethical seinctions in
tenns of which democracy is validated?
In the application of theory to practice we note with Reinhold Niebuhr
and Morris Cohen some other difficulties. It seems to be almost impossible
to obtain the same degree of results in social life as in physical science
^Ibid.
^Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, pp. 85-8?•
^*^Saffluel DuBois Cook, "An Inquiry Into The Ethical Foundations of
Democracy" (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Political





through the application of the methodology of science. Niebuhr says:
The idea that we cannot be socially intelligent until
we begin experimentation in social problems in the
way that the physical scientists experimented fails
to take account of an ln5)ortant difference between
the physical eind the social sciences. The physical
sciences gained their freedom when they overcame
the traditionalism based on ignorance, but the
traditionalism which the social sciences face is
based upon the economic interest of the domineint
social classes who are trying to maintain their
special privileges in society. Nor can the dif¬
ference between the very character of the social
and physical sciences be overlooked. Con^lete
rational objectivity in a social situation is im¬
possible. The very social scientists who are so
anxious to offer our generation councils of salva¬
tion are disappointed that an ignorant and sloth¬
ful people are so slow to accept their wisdom, be¬
tray middle-class prejudices in almost everything
they write. Since reason is always, to some degree,
the servant of interest in a social situation, social
Injustice cannot be resolved by moral and rational
suasion alone, as the social scientist usually
believes.
Morris R. Cohen asserts that Dewey fails to realize the inadequacies of
human intelligence against the actuality of an imperfect world.
Indeed Bertrand Russell insists that Dewey's philosophy contributes to the
intoxication of power.
The term "consequences" is a keynote in the desirability of democracy,
as Dewey conceives it. "E5q)erimental intelligence" is another keynote.
We may outline Dewey's case by saying that experimental intelligence is the
^%einhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York, 1932), p. xiv.
l4
Ibid., xiv-xv.
^^Morris Cohen, "John Dewey eind His School," American Thought (Glencoe,
1954), p. 291.
^^Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York, 19^5
p. 828.
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process by which one analyzes and determines which consequences are best
suited to the occasion or situation. The crucial term in this premise
is best. Mere gathering of data cannot determine which consequences will
best suit the situation. Data are not self-interpretative. Individuals
interpret data. Unless, then, there are some objective criteria for
determining the best or the desirable, we cannot be sure in identifying
the best. Hence the best means different things to different persons.
"Best," as Morris Cohen says, may be a matter of preference.^"7^
The political and social philosophy of John Dewey is appealing. As
Americans we are attracted to the democratic ideal. If we accept it ixn-
questioningly, it justifies our position through its alliance with science
and the scientific method. As Samuel DuBois Cook says in "An Inquiry
Into The Ethical Foundations of Democracy," it is hard to deny the desira-
18
bility of the achievements made by modern scientific discoveries.
Furthermore our traditional American background plays up the dignity of
the human spirit and the other elements -vdiich Dewey emphasizes in his theory
of democracy.To this may be added the fact that Dewey's purpose is
to provide a philosophy which could best help the individual adjust to
his environment and develop his "native capacities." Dewey's pxirpose in
itself appeals to the "American tenper," says Morris Cohen. All of this
^^Cohen, op. cit., pp. 295-296.
18
Samuel DuBois Cook, "An Inquiry Into The Ethical Foimdatlons of
Democracy, " p. 203.
19 ■ ^
Dewey, Freedom and Culture, chs. 5 6.
20
Cohen, op. cit., p. 292.
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adds up to the justification which Dewey's political and social philosophy
provided for our American Culture. Moreover, it adds adequate reason
for sustaining and improving upon American culture, and Dewey even tells
21
us how to achieve the in^jrovement.
Dewey's vindication of democracy is important hecause it is one
of the first attenpts to justify democracy on grounds other them
appeals to natural rights and universal ethical standards. Our conclusion
is that of Morris Cohen's who says: There is no doubt that history "will
record that in sji age of waning faith in human nature, Dewey was one of
the few who rallied those who believed in the ca\ise of liberalism based
pp
on faith in the value of intellectual enlightenment."
^^John Dewey, "Denracracy and Educational Administration," Problems
of Men (New York, 19^6), pp. 58-61.
22
Cohen, op. cit., p. 301.
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